It's been a while since I've posted (explanation will be posted in a bit) so I thought I would review recent Alaska cases. There's also a very important 9th Circuit case I want to talk about separately. So here they are:
In McDole v. State, Mr. McDole was convicted of theft for unlawfully receiving unemployment benefits. There were two issues in the case. The first dealt with whether he was a first or second felony offender for presumptive purposes. In Alaska, a person has to be off probation for ten years before prior felonies do not count for presumptive purposes. So, if you're convicted of a felony on 1/1/2006 and spend 2 years on probation, a conviction for any crime until 1/1/2018 will mean that you are a second felony offender for presumptive purposes. This means you get a) a higher sentence, and b) a loss of discretionary parole.
McDole was unconditionally discharged from probation in 1991. The state charged him with one aggregate count of felony theft. The thefts started in June, 2000 and went through 2002. McDole argued that since some of the thefts occurred in 2002, after the 10 years was up, he should not be considered a second felony offender for presumptive purposes. Court of Appeals doesn't buy it. The thefts started well before the October, 2001, date when the 10 year period would expire, so he's a second felony offender.
He also argued that the court erred by not sending an uncontested aggravator (history of similar conduct) to the jury. Court finds that this is a procedural error that was not disputed and so its analyzed under plain error (see Milligrock v. State, 118 P.3d 11 (Alaska App. 2005), applying plain error to undisputed aggravators). So, no relief for Mr. McDole under Blakely.
Next is Grossman v. State. Mr. Grossman was convicted of second degree murder for beating a fellow to death. He was sentenced to 99 years imprisonment. Grossman argued that the instructions regarding accomplice liability were flawed. Accomplice liability is a little complicated in Alaska. In order to convict someone as an accomplice, they must aid another in committing the crime "with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense." This means that the person convicted as an accomplice must have acted with the same mens rea as the principal. Under the murder 2 theory here, the state had to prove that Grossman intended to cause serious physical injury (and actually caused death) or he behaved with "extreme indifference to the value of human life".
Grossman's argument is that in the main case on this point, Riley v. State, 60 P.3d 204 (Alaska App. 2002)(ed. - essential reading for a study of accomplice liability), the Court had discussed conduct. He had committed only one act. Thus, according to Grossman, Riley requires more than 1 act and the jury instruction allowed a conviction for only one act. Court of Appeals doesn't agree. They hold that you can be convicted as an accomplice for only one act.
Grossman also argues his sentence was wrong based on Blakely. Problem is, murder 2 has a wide range of possible sentences, including 99 years. No aggravators or mitigators apply in murder sentences (including murder 2), so there was nothing for the court to send to the jury. This is complicated a little by an Alaska case, Page v. State, 657 P.2d 850 (Alaska App. 1983), establishing a 20-30 year benchmark guideline for murder 2 cases. COA holds that a common-law benchmark is not the same thing as a statutorily prescribed sentence. As such, Blakely doesn't apply.